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I use critical phenomenological resources in Tetsurō Watsuji and Sarah Ahmed to explore the 
spatial origin of some social impairments in Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD). I argue that a 
critical phenomenological perspective puts pressure on the idea that social impairments in ASD 
are exclusively (or even primarily) neurocognitive deficits that can be addressed by focusing on 
cognitive factors internal to the autistic person — for example, training them to adopt a more 
neurotypical approach to social cognition. Instead, I argue that the structure and character of 
some neurotypical spaces may play a regulative role in shaping aspects of at least some of the 
social impairments autistic people exhibit when they inhabit these spaces. I also briefly consider 
some possible therapeutic applications of this critical phenomenological approach. 
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Introduction 
Characterizations of intentionality, temporality, embodiment, subjectivity, and 
intersubjectivity by phenomenologists like Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty are routinely 
used to clarify experiential disturbances found in psychiatric conditions like schizophrenia, 
severe depression, and anorexia nervosa. However, more contemporary concepts and debates 
within critical phenomenology — which incorporate insights from feminist theorists, critical 
race theorists, queer theorists, decolonial, and indigenous scholars to      challenge classical 
phenomenology’s privileging of transcendental subjectivity over transcendental intersubjectivity      
(see Guenther 2013; Salamon 2018; Weiss, Salamon, and Murphy 2019) — appear much less 
frequently.1 Even rarer are references to non-western phenomenologists like the Japanese thinker 
Tetsurō Watsuji.2  
Here, I have two main objectives. First, I bring critical and non-western phenomenology 
into constructive dialogue. I explore possible ways to integrate Tetsurō Watsuji’s 
phenomenology of aidagara (“betweenness”) and Sarah Ahmed’s phenomenology of 
“disorientation”. Second, I apply this work to social impairments in autism. Social impairments 
in autism are often characterized as a kind of epistemic disorientation: a Theory of Mind deficit 
that impedes the individual’s ability to attribute mental states to others, use these attributions to 
interpret and predict others’ behavior, and grasp norm-governed rules regulating conduct in 
social spaces (Baron-Cohen 1995). Drawing on Watsuji and Ahmed, I put pressure on this neuro-
 
1 While these concepts and debates in critical phenomenology have yet to migrate to phenomenological 
psychopathology, there are nevertheless rich discussions in other related areas that make use of them — for 
example, critical phenomenological approaches to disability (Diedrich 2001; Abrams 2020; Valentine 2020) and 
illness (Carel 2016; Lajoie 2019; Toombs 1987).  
2 Bin Kimura’s work on schizophrenia is one exception, although most of his work is not translated into English. 
See Krueger 2019, 2020.  
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cognitive perspective. I argue that many social impairments arise from a more fundamental 
bodily disorientation: a felt sense of being bodily and affectively out-of-sync with neurotypical 
spaces not set up to accommodate non-neurotypical styles of being in the world. I consider some 
consequences of this relational approach for thinking about the nature of social impairments in 
autism and conclude with possible therapeutic applications. 
 
Watsuji, “betweenness”, and the dynamics of social space 
I begin with an exposition of Watsuji’s core notion of “betweenness” (aidagara). Watsuji 
was an extremely prolific writer. However, few of his books are translated into English. One of 
them is Rinrigaku (“Ethics”) (1937/1996), arguably his most important book. It is here that 
Watsuji develops his phenomenology of aidagara, or “betweenness”. For Watsuji, 
“betweenness” captures experiential and relational dynamics that generate basic forms of 
embodied selfhood (McCarthy 2011). Most of what he writes about ethics, social ontology, and 
the self emerges from this notion (Shields 2009). 
Aidagara is a common Japanese term referring to relationships between people: being a 
sibling, citizen, teacher, taxi driver, or tax advisor. However, in choosing this term, Watsuji has a 
more nuanced phenomenological focus in mind. For him, aidagara is an ontological category of 
human being. It is, therefore, not reducible to the ontic relationships of everyday life (e.g., being 
a sibling, taxi driver, etc.) (Johnson 2019, 84). While aidagara can include these ontic 
relationships — we cannot exist without taking up some of them — it instead captures a more 
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fundamental sense in which the very being of the subject is bound up with the network of 
relationships and spaces it shares with others (Krueger 2019; McCarthy 2011).3       
More precisely, “betweenness” for Watsuji captures the interrelation between 
subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and space. As embodied and situated subjects, human reality is 
organized by dimensions and intensities of spatiality. We are like other things in the world 
insofar as we take up space. We have physical bodies that can bump into things and sit on flat 
surfaces. However, we are not simply in space the way that tables, rocks, and trees are. We live 
it. We inhabit space in a qualitative way. Consider, for example, the felt difference between a 
stranger pressing into our personal space in a crowded elevator versus a romantic partner or close 
friend; what it’s like to walk into a party and suddenly realize you don’t know anyone; or the 
ominous character our favorite park takes on when the sun goes down, the park empties, and 
night closes in.  
For Watsuji, lived space “is not so much the essential quality of a physical body as it is 
the manner in which the subject operates” (Watsuji 1996, 170–171). The space of betweenness is 
tied to our agency (“the manner in which the subject operates”). Moreover, since the manner in 
which the subject operates is always shaped by practices and spaces it inherits from others, the 
space of betweenness is an intersubjective space. Watsuji’s phenomenology of betweenness is, 
therefore, concerned with investigating the character and embodied dynamics of this spatiality 
and its constitutive relation with subjectivity and intersubjectivity. This focus leads Watsuji to 
assert that the spatiality of betweenness “is not the same as space in the world of nature”; rather, 
it is “the betweenness itself of subjective human beings” (ibid., 156–157).  
 
3 Watsuji’s formulation of “betweenness” is also deeply influenced by Buddhist characterizations of the empty 
nature of all things, including the self. See Johnson (2016) and McCarthy (2011).  
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We will explore case studies of betweenness in more detail below. For now, we can note 
that for Watsuji, the spatiality of human betweenness takes many forms and degrees of intensity: 
from tactile and kinaesthetic intimacies of infant-caregiver interactions or sexual intercourse, to 
more expansive forms of betweenness within large groups (professional communities, political 
communities, or religious organizations). It can even include different ways technologies 
organize flows of information, communication, and transportation that enable possibilities for 
social connection. This emphasis on the qualitative character of space is what Watsuji has in 
mind when he says that betweenness is “the manner in which multiple subjects are related to one 
another. It is not a uniform extendedness, but a dialectical one, in which relations such as “far 
and near, wide and narrow” are mutually transformed into one another. In a word, it is the 
betweenness itself of subjective human beings” (Watsuji 1996, 157).   
The “dialectical” character of betweenness indicates that it is not something fixed or found 
pre-given in the world. Rather, it is a way of sharing spaces with others that is actively 
constructed. By deliberately organizing spaces that comprise our shared world, we determine 
what we do with the space of betweenness, that is, how we connect with others in and through 
it.4 We structure our spaces in ways that both support and limit possibilities for movement, 
action, connection, and expression. We do so by establishing relations such as “far and near, 
wide and narrow” within those spaces. For instance, think about differences in the forms of 
betweenness possible in a lecture hall, night shelter, sporting arena, mosque, online video chat, 
hospital, queer club, or military barracks — or, relatedly, the way these same spaces may be 
 
4 Of course, what we do with the spaces we inhabit, that is, how we actively organize them to connect with (or 
exclude) others, involves, among other things, issues of power and privilege. More on this below.   
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experienced by individuals from different cultural backgrounds, say, or a person with a chronic 
illness, multiple sclerosis, or visual impairments.  
Crucially for what follows, spaces of betweenness in this way function as “forms of 
alignment” that bring bodies in line with others (Ahmed 2006, p.15). By directing bodies in some 
ways more than others, they determine what is both possible and, importantly, permissible when 
finding one’s way in the world. For Watsuji, then, it is not enough to think of space as something 
we simply find ourselves in due to our physical embodiment. It is something we play an active 
role in co-creating and sustaining – and we do so with others.  
For our purposes, the key take-away point is this: Watsuji’s phenomenology of 
betweenness shows us that there is a sense in which our bodies (i.e., how we experience them, 
what we do with them) take shape in the spaces around them. These forms of betweenness open 
up possibilities for, and impose limitations on, the bodies that inhabit them. They do so by 
bringing bodies in line with one another. And this alignment, in turn, determines both what is 
possible and permissible for bodies as they find their way in the world. The shared spaces of 
betweenness in this way have normative dimensions. They are co-constructed. Accordingly, they 
take shape around the values, practices, and preferences of those who inhabit them. In light of 
these normative dimensions, some bodies feel more at home in — or are allowed to feel more at 
home in — our shared spaces than are others. This idea productively connects with Sarah 
Ahmed’s phenomenology of “disorientation”, which I turn to now.  
 
Ahmed, disorientations, and losing one’s way 
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As Watsuji’s phenomenology of betweenness highlights, everyday life — whether at 
work, home, or play — involves negotiating shared spaces. We spend our days “finding our 
way”, as Ahmed (2006) puts it, through different forms of betweenness. The deeply social 
character of everyday spaces is so close to us that it is easy to overlook. However, there are 
occasions when we become acutely aware of it — often when we lose access to it. In other 
words, we often become aware of the social character of space when, as we try to find our way, 
we become disoriented.  
The disorientation I have in mind here involves more than just getting lost because one 
lacks the relevant information needed to find one’s way. It involves a felt sense that one is no 
longer finding one’s way. A central part of its phenomenal character involves not feeling at home 
in a particular space, or relatedly, feeling bodily out of sync with, or affectively unsettled within 
or impeded by, wherever one happens to be. I discuss a number of examples in more detail 
below. For now, we can simply note that this experience can arise from feeling that the people 
we share space with are somehow indifferent, unfriendly, or hostile to us; or, that the space itself 
is set up in ways that are not designed to accommodate or be responsive to our specific values, 
interests, and needs. The important point for what follows is that this felt loss of at-home-ness is 
an experiential cue that one is no longer finding one’s way.5  
 
5 A reviewer objects that this felt loss of at-home-ness is better described as an experience of radical alienation, an 
experience of being cut off from space in a way that makes us confront its anonymous and non-social character. 
Such experiences may indeed occur. But that’s not what I mean by “disorientation”. I also don’t think it captures 
Ahmed’s use of the term or the phenomenon I consider below. The experience of disorientation I’m interested in is 
constitutively social. It arises precisely because individuals recognize that they inhabit a shared (i.e., social) world 
that is nevertheless somehow bodily inaccessible to them in a way that is not the case for others. This felt loss of 
access to various social resources – resources that are, once more, available to others – is an essential part of its 
character. More on this in what follows. 
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Disorientations can develop in different ways and vary in their scope and intensity. This 
is because they are not unusual or rare experiences. Rather, they are common and deeply 
relatable (Harbin 2016, xiv).6 Most people at some point in their lives experience profound grief, 
a major injury or illness, a crisis of faith, divorce, or some other kind of experience that shifts 
how they understand themselves and the world more generally. These major life experiences can 
be deeply disorienting; as we go through them, we may not always have a clear sense of how to 
find our way. However, not all of the disorientation experiences we have necessarily involve the 
pronounced bodily-affective and spatial disruptions I am here particularly concerned with.  
For example, if I lose my religious faith, I may experience a feeling of disorientation as I 
gradually leave behind the familiarity of my former life and adjust to new ways of interpreting 
the world and my place in it. This is, at least in part, a kind of epistemic disorientation; it 
involves a significant shift in some of my core beliefs (e.g., about whether or not God exists; the 
authority of religious texts; the ultimate point of life, etc.). While this shift may impact my 
behavior (e.g., I no longer go to church each Sunday; deny myself certain things out of religious 
fidelity; or interpret specific events as part of God’s plan, etc.), this kind of epistemic 
disorientation nevertheless need not involve the rich bodily-affective feeling that I am somehow 
now out-of-sync with or not at home in the spaces I inhabit and the people I interact with.  
Of course, it could involve this feeling, or something close to it. I might be aware of this 
feeling if, say, I visit my former place of worship or socialize with religious friends. Many kinds 
of epistemic disorientations probably do involve some sort of bodily and affective component. 
After all, experiences are complex and minds are essentially embodied. However, there 
 
6 See Harbin (2016) for important work on the moral significance of disorientation experiences. 
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nevertheless seem to be occasions where epistemic and bodily-affective dimensions of 
disorientation experiences can come apart in interesting ways.7 As I discuss in more detail below, 
certain kinds of bodies may experience the feeling of being profoundly bodily disoriented and 
impeded by the world without necessarily experiencing the co-occurrence of a similarly intense 
epistemic disorientation. 
In sum, the point is simply to draw a rough distinction between the possibility of a kind 
of epistemic disorientation (which is interesting in its own right) and a phenomenologically 
richer bodily-affective disorientation with a distinctive spatial structure and character. This latter 
kind of disorientation — again, what I’m referring to as a bodily disorientation — is my focus 
here. Moreover, as I read it, this bodily focus aligns with Ahmed’s rendering of “disorientation”, 
which helpfully draws our attention to political dimensions of betweenness Watsuji doesn’t 
consider.8 I turn to a more focused phenomenological consideration of Ahmed on the politics of 
bodily disorientations now.    
 
Ahmed and the politics of bodily disorientations 
By “bodily-affective”, I am referring to the fundamental way we experience our body and 
its capacities for movement, expression, and action (i.e., our felt sense of agency). 
 
7 Liat Ben-Moshe (2018, p.2) points to discussions in activist circles about the connection between knowledge of 
injustice and action. Activists note that individuals can experience a kind of epistemic disorientation – e.g., they can 
acquire world-changing knowledge about the racist, gendered, racial capitalist, and ableist “carceral logics” driving 
mass incarceration and the prison-industrial complex – that may profoundly shift how they think about notions of 
justice, fairness, and equality. However, this epistemic disorientation may not be accompanied by a significant 
bodily-affective disorientation or drive to political action. See also Calme (2020) for a similar discussion of 
epistemic disorientation, race, and “white fragility”.  
8 To be fair, Watsuji does have much to say about political ethics and agency. For example, he extends his critique 
of moral individualism to a sociopolitical and global level (Sevilla 2017). Nevertheless, Ahmed focuses on themes 
like institutional exclusion, embodiment, gender, and race that go beyond Watsuji’s analysis.   
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Phenomenologists often describe these experiences as a “pre-reflective” form of bodily self-
awareness (Colombetti 2014). This simply means that our body is implicitly present as we 
perceive and act on the world, dynamically shaping both what we experience and how we 
experience it. As we move through the world and do things, we don’t explicitly attend to our 
body or plan each movement. We simply live through our bodies onto the world by responding 
to what the environment affords. As Ahmed (drawing on Merleau-Ponty) observes, “the body is 
habitual insofar as it ‘trails behind’ in the performing of action, insofar as it does not pose ‘a 
problem’ or an obstacle to the action, or is not ‘stressed’ by ‘what’ the action encounters…the 
habitual body does not get in the way of an action: it is behind the action” (Ahmed 2007, 156). 
Our pre-reflective, bodily-affective experience in this way anchors us in the forms of 
betweenness we inhabit.9 
As Ahmed repeatedly emphasizes, the character of our pre-reflective bodily experience is 
bound up with space. For example, if I am forced to work in a colleague’s office for the day 
while mine is being repainted, I may experience a kind of bodily disorientation. The furniture, 
layout, height and hardness of the chair, the pictures and art, stains on the carpet, smells and 
sounds from the office next door are all somehow different. I experience them as unfamiliar; they 
are not the sorts of things I habitually encounter within the self-curated contours of my own 
workspace. Accordingly, for that day I may feel mildly disoriented (even if only in a low-level 
 
9 Phenomenologists observe that we also experience our bodies as objects, too. We think about our bodies, reflect on 
and take up emotional attitudes toward them, and become aware of different ways that others perceive, evaluate, and 
respond to our bodies as objects of their experience (Gallagher 2005). Discussions of how certain kinds of bodies 
(e.g., queer bodies, non-white bodies, aging bodies, “crip” bodies, etc.) are objectified and “othered” via socio-
political structures of the lifeworld are important parts of critical phenomenology. However, I here instead follow 
Ahmed, Fanon, and thinkers like Iris Marion Young (1980) to consider ways these socio-political structures reach 
down into and shape fundamental forms of bodily experience “from the inside”, including our felt capacities for 
movement, action, and expression.          
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way), slightly irritated, and relatively unproductive. My body struggles to extend into and take 
shape within the contours of that space.  
Of course, this is a very mild — and indeed, very privileged — experience of 
disorientation. Nevertheless, bodily disorientation can, in other contexts, be much more intense 
and have significant practical and political consequences. Critical phenomenologists draw our 
attention to powerful connections between bodily disorientation and the politics of social space 
— that is, the profound, and potentially devastating, consequences of ensuring that certain kinds 
of bodies (e.g., non-white bodies, queer bodies) are not allowed to comfortably find their way 
(e.g., Fanon 1986; Ahmed 2006, 2007; Yancy 2016). Certain spaces are often configured to 
deliberately constrain these bodies and disturb them at a pre-reflective level. 
 Ahmed tells us that “[f]or bodies that are not extended by the skin of the social, bodily 
movement is not so easy” (Ahmed 2007, 161). In support of this claim, she develops a 
phenomenology of “being stopped”. Black activism, Ahmed notes, draws our attention to the 
many ways that policing involves a “differential economy of stopping”. Some bodies — mainly 
non-white bodies — are stopped by the police more than others. They are impeded from freely 
finding their way: e.g., being pulled over while driving, or harassed while trying to enter their 
home. But being stopped occurs in other (i.e., non-policing) contexts, too, such as when non-
white bodies are bombarded with racist images or memes in online spaces, or passed over for a 
job despite having equivalent (or better) qualifications than a white candidate. 
This stopping doesn’t just place practical constraints on stopped bodies by depriving 
them of access to certain things and spaces (although it does). It also has significant 
phenomenological consequences: it induces a perpetual bodily disorientation, a disturbance of 
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that stopped body at a pre-reflective level. This is because the persistent threat of being stopped 
isn’t an abstract or ephemeral thing. It endures. It is materially encoded within different contexts 
of betweenness designed to unsettle and disorient certain bodies. A stark example is the 
proliferation of “Whites Only” and “Colored” signs once found above drinking fountains, 
waiting rooms, toilets, restaurants, and swimming pools across the American landscape well into 
the 20th century.10  
This persistent materialized threat leaves its traces on stopped bodies (Ahmed 2007, 
p.158). These traces are present not only when stopped bodies inhabit acutely threatening spaces 
but also when they move on to other spaces, too. This is because, as Fanon observes, stopped 
bodies are perpetually “surrounded by an atmosphere of certain uncertainty” (Fanon 1986, 83). 
Can I use this toilet? Why did that police car slow down as it drove by? Why are the diners at the 
next table staring at me? Why is this security guard following me as I shop? For both Fanon and 
Ahmed, no space is entirely free from the threat of being stopped. As Ahmed emphasizes, the 
threatening character of these spaces means that “[t]hose who get stopped are moved in a 
different way” as they find their way through the world (Ahmed 2006, 162); they are never 
allowed to fully extend and take shape within everyday contexts of betweenness. 
Ahmed says that her Muslim name similarly disrupts her bodily experience. It slows her 
down as she finds her way through the world. This is because her body is continually marked as 
“could be Muslim”, which is immediately translated into “could be terrorist”. As a result, 
“[h]aving been singled out in the line, at the borders, we become defensive; we assume a 
defensive posture, as we ‘wait’ for the line of racism, to take our rights of passage away” (ibid., 
 
10 Despite popular assumptions to the contrary, these signs were not confined to the South — and some could still be 
found through the 1970s (Abel 2010). 
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163). Ahmed’s non-white body is brought into line with other non-white bodies also marked 
with “terrorist” names. In being singled out and made to wait, government authorities make clear 
that to be a non-white body in the west “is to be not extended by the spaces you inhabit” (ibid., 
163). Rather, it is to be made to feel continually out-of-sync with — disoriented by and within — 
those spaces and the atmosphere of certain uncertainty that pervades them. 
In this way, Ahmed’s phenomenology of disorientation can enrich Watsuji’s 
phenomenology of betweenness. Watsuji highlights the qualitative and co-constructed character 
of our shared spaces and their connection with our experience of embodiment and agency. 
However, Ahmed goes beyond Watsuji in drawing out the politics of betweenness by analyzing 
ways that certain bodies are made to feel disoriented by the structure and character of the 
different contexts of betweenness they inhabit. Equipped with this critical phenomenological 
framework, we can now turn to a consideration of betweenness, bodily disorientation, and social 
impairments in autism. 
 
Autism, embodiment, and finding one’s way 
How does all this relate to autism? Simply put, autistic bodies are often stopped bodies. 
They are not allowed to fully extend into and take shape within the spaces they inhabit — forms 
of betweenness organized primarily around the form of neurotypical bodies. As a result, autistic 
persons often experience a kind of pre-reflective bodily disorientation within these spaces which 
can, in turn, inform and intensify some of their social difficulties. This claim has significance for 
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understanding the nature of social impairments in autism as well as potential intervention 
strategies.11   
 
Social impairments and epistemic disorientations in autism 
Autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) spans a range of impairments. These impairments are 
wide-ranging and vary from one individual to the next. However, they tend to cluster around a 
diagnostic triad of social, communicative, and imaginative difficulties (Frith 2003). Autistic 
people tend to show a preference for order, predictability, and routine; they can become 
preoccupied with specific subjects, activities, and idiosyncratic habits. They also struggle to 
communicate with others, become attuned to their emotions and intentions, and flexibly adapt to 
changing social environments (Bader 2020). 
The still-dominant way of thinking about impaired social cognition and the autistic mind 
is the neuro-cognitive perspective (Chapman 2019, 422). According to this perspective, autistic 
differences can be explained by neurocognitive differences found in all autistic individuals. 
These differences are said to cluster around a central trait: a diminished capacity for empathy, or 
mentalizing, when compared to neurotypicals (Baron-Cohen 1995). Autistic persons struggle to 
find their way in the social world because they struggle to cognize the existence of other minds. 
This empathy deficit leads to difficulties interpreting and predicting others’ behavior, and 
smoothly integrating with the shared practices that make up everyday life.      
 
11 I here follow the terminological preferences of neurodiversity proponents who, by endorsing identity-first 
language (“autistic persons”) instead of person-first language (“individuals with autism”), deliberately stress the 
connection between cognitive styles and selfhood (Pellicano and Stears 2011). 
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Note that for this neuro-cognitive perspective, social impairments in autism flow from a 
kind of epistemic disorientation. Again, autistic people struggle settling into neurotypical spaces 
because they lack the cognitive capacities and understanding of other minds (i.e., Theory of 
Mind) needed to become attuned to others’ intentions and behavior. Neurocognitive therapeutic 
interventions were developed precisely to address this epistemic disorientation. These strategies 
— with names like “mind-reading” training, “picture-in-the-head teaching”, and “thought-bubble 
training” — are tailored specifically to help individuals develop and refine their mentalizing 
capacities.     
Before proceeding further, let me be clear: I am not suggesting that these programs are 
without value. Many autistic people find them helpful. Moreover, it may be that some kind of 
epistemic disorientation is an important part of many autistic persons’ struggles to feel anchored 
in neurotypical spaces. I am instead arguing that we should adopt a more holistic and 
multidimensional approach to social impairments in autism. This is because adopting an 
exclusively neurocognitive perspective downplays, or even overlooks altogether, the way 
embodied, interactive, relational, and developmental processes are partly constitutive of autistic 
styles of thinking, expressing, and sharing emotions and experiences (Bizzari 2018; De Jaegher 
2013; Schilbach 2016; Krueger and Maiese 2018; Roberts, Krueger, and Glackin 2019). Looking 
at the role bodily (and not just epistemic) disorientations play in ASD social impairments can 
help make the importance of some of these processes clearer.   
A useful way to think about a more holistic alternative is to see ASD as a form of life 
(Chapman 2019). Forms of life are, as I use the idea here, forms of betweenness. To see ASD as 
a form of life is to pay particular attention to unique styles of embodiment that are distinctive of 
ASD (Krueger 2021). There is now growing sensitivity to the ways autistic persons use their 
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bodies to find their way — that is, move through the world, express emotions, and respond to the 
people, things, and spaces around them (Doan and Fenton 2013). These embodied (or 
sensorimotor) approaches to ASD move away from an excessive focus on neurocognitive traits 
and explanations. Instead, they refocus on distinctive ways autistic persons pre-reflectively 
experience and live through their bodies as they use their bodily agency to organize sensory 
information and negotiate shared spaces (Donnellan, Hill, and Leary 2012). However, as Watsuji 
and Ahmed remind us, bodies don’t merely inhabit space. They create it. Moreover, the spaces 
they create are often embedded within encompassing spaces that other bodies have created. A 
critical phenomenological approach therefore brings to light the ways co-created spaces within 
ASD forms of life — spaces that are not necessarily set up by people with ASD — can disorient 
such bodies but also, potentially, disclose possibilities for more inclusiveness, connection, and 
understanding.   
 
Bodily disorientations in autism and losing one’s way 
Neurocognitive perspectives say little about bodily experience in ASD. However, looking 
at the role of the body is crucial for understanding how autistic people find their way. From an 
external neurotypical perspective, ASD styles of embodiment may initially seem unusual or 
strange. The timing and flow of their movements can appear odd or contextually inappropriate. 
For example, people with ASD may have an unusual gait or posture, and exhibit movements, 
tics, and habits (e.g., rocking, hand-flapping, spinning, exaggerated gestures, etc.) that are off-
putting for neurotypicals. They may repeatedly shrug, squint, pout or rock back and forth; 
repeatedly touch a particular object; turn away when someone tries to engage with them; 
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maintain an unusual or inert posture; appear “stuck” in indecisive movements for an 
uncomfortably long period of time; have trouble imitating actions; or require explicit prompts to 
perform an action.  
Distinct styles of embodiment in ASD aren’t simply apparent from a third-person, 
external vantage point, however. First-person reports suggest that people with autism pre-
reflectively experience their body from the inside in ways that depart from neurotypical 
experience, too. The character of these anomalous bodily experiences contributes to their 
distinctive behavior, which in turn leads to difficulties fitting into the world of neurotypicals.  
For example, reports indicate that people with autism often experience difficulties 
controlling, executing, and combining movements — from fine motor control, grip planning, and 
anticipatory movements, to more complex action-sequences like gesturing, reaching for a book, 
dancing, or negotiating a crowded hallway (Eigsti 2013). Sometimes this feeling results not just 
from objective, measurable coordination difficulties but also from a felt sense of diminished 
agency and bodily control. This feeling seems connected to the sense that one’s body has a mind 
of its own, particularly when stressed or overstimulated: “I had an automatic urge to touch my 
body — rub my thighs or my stomach and chest” (Robledo, Donnellan, and Strandt-Conroy 
2012, 6). At other times, however, individuals with ASD report diminished proprioceptive and 
kinaesthetic awareness of limb position and spatial orientation (Blanche et al. 2012). Difficulty 
locating one’s body in space can lead to challenges when it comes to smoothly interacting with 
the environment. In order to cope, some individuals seek sustained deep pressure or joint 
compression to regain a felt sense of bodily integrity (Leary and Donnellan 2012, 60). Strategies 
include lying on the floor under a mattress or sofa cushions, jumping on the floor or bed, wearing 
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multiple layers of clothing, banging fists on hard surfaces, or sitting in a plush recliner, bathtub, 
or swimming pool in order to have the experience of being touched all over. 
For our purposes, the important point is this: these anomalous bodily experiences lead 
some people with ASD to feel as though their styles of embodiment do not smoothly integrate 
with neurotypical spaces and the patterns of interaction comprising these spaces. Some of the 
causal factors responsible for these anomalous bodily experiences likely reside within the 
neurophysiology of the individual. However, a significant portion of these factors appear to be 
social: individuals have the experience of being “stopped” by structures and norm-governed 
character of neurotypical spaces. Accordingly, this sense of being stopped informs and 
intensifies aspects of their pre-reflective bodily disorientation within these spaces.     
To see how so, we can let people with ASD describe their own experiences of being 
stopped, and the bodily disorientations that ensues.12 For example, one individual says that, “I 
was sitting on the floor and when I got up after looking at a couple of books, my friend said I got 
up like an animal does” — and further, that although she is aware that her bodily style differs 
from those of neurotypicals, she remains unsure of how it differs, exactly (Robledo, Donnellan, 
and Strandt-Conroy 2012, 6). Another person says that she will easily “lose the rhythm” required 
to perform sequences of action requiring two or more movements, and that “[e]verything has to 
be thought out” in advance (ibid., p. 6), which gives her movements an excessively stiff and 
unnatural quality. This felt disconnection both from her own body, along with a sense that she is 
rhythmically out-of-sync with the neurotypical spaces she inhabits — and judged negatively 
because of this — leads to frustration and a deepened sense of bodily disorientation: “I have been 
 
12 Chapman (2019) observes that first-person reports of autistic people are often left out of philosophical and 
psychological discussions of autism (p.426).   
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endlessly criticized about how different I looked, criticized about all kinds of tiny differences in 
my behavior…No one ever tried to really understand what it was like to be me…” (ibid., p. 6). 
For people with ASD, moving through neurotypical spaces is often characterized by an 
atmosphere of certain uncertainty: a perpetual anticipation that one is about to be negatively 
impacted or judged for not settling into the bodily dynamics of these spaces in a comfortably 
familiar (i.e., neurotypical) way.  
These reports — and many more like them (see Leary and Donnellan (2012)) — suggest 
that autistic bodies struggle to extend themselves into spaces organized around the form, and 
norms, of neurotypical spaces. Forms of engagement, expression, and sharing acceptable within 
ASD forms of life are often actively discouraged and negatively evaluated within neurotypical 
spaces. This felt resistance limits bodily possibilities for people with ASD when they inhabit 
these spaces and contributes to the feeling of being bodily stopped. This resistance might be 
acutely felt when negotiating the material structure of different neurotypical spaces such as a 
noisy, brightly lit lecture hall, restaurant, or retail space that negatively impacts an individual’s 
auditory and visual hypersensitivity. But it can also be felt within the interpersonal spaces of 
everyday social interactions, too. 
A striking example of how ASD styles of embodiment shape contexts of betweenness is 
found by looking at delayed responses in conversation. Donnellan and colleagues found that 
twelve young adolescents with minimal verbal skills, all of whom were labelled developmentally 
disabled or autistic, could offer competent conversational responses — but only, on average, 
after fourteen seconds of silence (Leary and Donnellan 2012, 57). Most neurotypicals would find 
this slower-paced, interactional rhythm awkward. It would alter the character of that social space 
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in an unfamiliar way (i.e., for neurotypicals), and they would probably either quickly change the 
subject or leave the conversation altogether. 
Consider another example: when someone is asked a question like “Do I look good in 
this shirt?”.13 An autistic person might see this question as fact-seeking and give an honest and 
direct answer (“No, you do not.”). However, sensitive attunement to the broader context in which 
it is asked might reveal that the asker is instead seeking affirmation (“Sure, you look great!”), or 
at least honest but gentle critical feedback (“Hmm, not bad, but perhaps we can find a more 
flattering color.”). So, a direct and honest answer from an autistic person might be met with 
confusion, a hurt reaction, and lead to conflict — all of which they may find puzzling and 
disorienting and discourage them from future engagements. 
Importantly, this lack of attunement cuts both ways. As McGeer notes, people with ASD 
may be “blind to our minds, but so too are we blind to theirs” (Mcgeer 2009, 524; see also 
Krueger and Maiese 2018). Seeing how so helps to further highlight the spatial origin of some 
social impairments in ASD. For example, in autistic spaces, it is relatively normal — and 
acceptable — for autistics to avoid eye contact when speaking to someone. Within neurotypical 
spaces, however, people who do this are often wrongly judged to be deceptive or dishonest. 
Similarly, neurotypicals may find rhythmic patterns of “self-stimulation” (or “self-stims”) — 
hand-flapping, finger-snapping, tapping objects, repetitive vocalizations, or rocking back and 
forth, etc. — socially off-putting, and view them as meaningless behavior. Indeed, treatment 
programs (often developed with little input from autistic people) have traditionally tried to 
suppress or eliminate them (Azrin, Kaplan, and Foxx 1973). Yet, for many autistic people, self-
 
13 This example is taken from Chapman (2019, p.430). 
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stims are effective ways to manage incoming sensory information. They may use them to refocus 
and self-regulate when information threatens to be overwhelming (hypersensitivity), or when 
they require heightened arousal in order to access further information (hyposensitivity). In short, 
for many autistic people, self-stims are embodied strategies for finding one’s way. While people 
with ASD may be actively discouraged from bodily extending themselves via these strategies 
within neurotypical spaces, they nevertheless have the freedom to do so within autistic spaces 
where their meaning and salience is recognized. Observations such as these help to explain why 
the Internet has played such an important role in providing spaces for autistic people to develop 
online forms of life governed by distinctively autistic norms, vocabularies, and styles of 
expression (Hacking 2009).14    
The takeaway lesson from examples like these, I suggest, is that many so-called social 
impairments in ASD are context sensitive. They do not arise when people with ASD inhabit 
autistic spaces — again, spaces where these bodily practices are viewed as acceptable practices 
for finding one’s way. As one autistic person tells us: “If I socialize with other Aspergians of 
pretty much my own functionality, then all of the so-called social impairments simply don’t 
exist...we share the same operating systems, so there are no impairments” (Cornish 2008, 158). 
Reports like these are supported by studies indicating that high-functioning autistic people — 
despite anxiety and difficulties interacting with non-autistic people — find their interactions with 
other autistic persons efficient and pleasurable (Schilbach 2016; see also Komeda et al. 2015). 
Again, the latter are governed by ASD-friendly norms, expectations, and interactive possibilities 
 
14 See Osler (forthcoming) for a phenomenological discussion of how the lived body can enter online spaces and be 
empathically available to others within those spaces. 
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I have drawn upon critical phenomenological resources in Tetsurō Watsuji and Sarah 
Ahmed to explore the bodily and spatial origin of some social impairments in ASD. This critical 
phenomenological perspective puts pressure on the idea that social impairments in ASD are 
exclusively (or even primarily) neurocognitive deficits that can be addressed by focusing on 
cognitive factors internal to the autistic person — for example, training them to adopt a more 
neurotypical approach to social cognition. An important takeaway is that the structure and 
character of some neurotypical spaces may play a regulative role in shaping aspects of at least 
some of the social impairments and disorientation experiences autistic people have when they 
inhabit these spaces.  
Adopting a relational approach to ASD has potential therapeutic significance. Again, 
such an approach highlights the way orthodox neurocognitive approaches (1) overlook the role 
embodied, interactive, and spatial features play in shaping characteristic impairments; and (2) 
presuppose that social difficulties in ASD consist of a failure to conform to normative 
expectations of neurotypical people, without acknowledging or offering resources to address the 
two-way nature of these impairments. Relational intervention strategies should be tailored to 
address these shortcomings.  
To better connect with autistic people, neurotypicals should move beyond attempts to 
“fix” the heads of single individuals and instead consider ways of adjusting and recalibrating 
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material and normative features of the social world. These strategies can include constructing 
more inclusive ASD-friendly spaces that consider how things like colors, lights, textures, sounds, 
and smells may negatively impact ASD styles of embodiment and sensory processing, and 
potentially impede their ability to find their way. It may involve social skills training not just for 
autistic persons but also neurotypicals — for example, sensitizing the latter to characteristic ASD 
patterns of interaction (e.g., delayed conversational response) in order to become more flexible 
and responsive to such differences. Finally, it may also involve exploring alternative forms of 
therapeutic interventions, such as music therapy — a form of therapy that, for several reasons, 
seems particularly well-suited to positively impacting various forms of communicative, social-
emotional, and motor development in children and adults with ASD (Srinivasan and Bhat 2013; 
see also Krueger and Maiese, 29-32). Critical phenomenological resources from philosophers 
like Watsuji and Ahmed provide important conceptual resources for thinking through some of 
these spatial possibilities.  
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